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Fee-for-service payments and 
consultation length in general 
practice  
A work-leisure trade-off model for French GPs* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This article presents an adaptation of the labour supply model applied to the independent 
medical sector. First, we model simultaneous GP decisions on both the leisure time and the 
consultation length for two payment schemes: fixed fees and unregulated fees. The 
objective of this econometric study is to validate the theoretical prediction that doctors 
under unregulated-fees may make choices about the length of patient consultations 
independently of their personal leisure decision. Indeed, according to our empirical results, 
the bidirectional link between leisure choice and consultation length –verified with fixed-
fees– does not hold any longer under unregulated fees. Our findings can be seen as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to legitimise unregulated fees in general practice. 
Keywords. “Work-leisure trade-off”, “Working time”, “Consultation duration”,“General 
practitioners”, “Simultaneous equations” 
JEL codes. C13. C31. I11. J22. J30 
                                                          
*
  The authors are indebted to Brigitte Dormont, Hugh Gravelle and Jean-Paul 
Moatti for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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Introduction 
Planning the supply of ambulatory healthcare is a key component of the healthcare 
organisation in a country, both from the perspective of the well-being of the population and 
the perspective of public finances or health insurance. Independent ambulatory healthcare, 
which has been adopted by many countries for greater freedom of choice and higher quality 
in treatments, nevertheless comes at a cost. Public authorities can control fewer aspects of 
the system. In fact, three crucial parameters currently escape the control of the regulator: 
the location of the activity, the length of work, and the length of patient consultations, all of 
which have been associated with the quality of healthcare. The location and the geographic 
dimensions do not fall within the scope of this paper (see, for example, Scott, 20011). One 
can however state that different kinds of incentives can be implemented to better control 
physicians when they establish their practices. This paper focuses on the two other aspects 
of control mentioned above: duration of work and duration of patient consultation, which 
both might be the most difficult issues to monitor for self-employed physicians. 
Few studies have attempted to link the “duration of consultation” to the “total working-
time”, such as to test the relationship by which total working-time, which is an indicator of 
physician’s availability, can influence the time devoted to individual patients. Economists 
have taken an occasional interest in the overall labour supply of doctors2. However, even in 
these studies, consultation length is often left aside, in our opinion, for two reasons:  
-the scarcity of data allowing researchers to test for interaction among the length of 
consultation, patients’ characteristics, and the physicians’ socio-economic characteristics, 
e.g., income, prices, and other data necessary for defining the work/leisure trade-off;  
-a “cultural bias” in labour economics, which means that investigators rarely consider 
labour supply outside a wage-based contract and so they rarely take into account the 
specificities of independent activities (for self-employed workers, e.g. lawyers, notaries, 
                                                          
1
  In other countries, such as Canada, financial incentives have already been introduced 
specifically with the aim to encourage doctors to set up practices in the regions of Quebec where there 
is a lack of doctors (Bolduc et al, 1996, Benarroch and Grant, 2004). 
2
  The relevant papers in the field are: Sloan (1975), Noether (1986), Rizzo and 
Blumenthal (1994), Showalter and Thurston (1997), Thornton (1998). Thornton (1998) is close to our 
approach, inflating the role played by the consultation length as a way to adjust hourly earnings. 
Thornton demonstrates, within the context of self-employed GPs and specialists, that changes in 
earnings are followed by a negligible response in labour supply. We challenge this result for 
unregulated fees in France, studying also physician’s response in consultation length.   
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physicians) for which payment per hour cannot be computed from fees only, because, in 
fee-for-services, the time devoted to services may vary.  
In this paper, we present a standard work/leisure trade-off model adapted to independent 
medical activity, which contrasts with contractual labour in the following characteristics: no 
flat-rate payments (a “fee” per consultation) and greater freedom in determining schedules 
(length of consultation), but a stricter and more direct set of medical and professional 
constraints concerning work activity and income (the patients are “customers”). Section 1 
attempts to define the sets of constraints (economic and medical) to which independent 
doctors are subject when choosing their activity. This allows us to more accurately 
determine the factors influencing the length of consultation and the rules of work-leisure 
trade-off for this profession. Section 2 presents the French institutional perspective and data 
obtained from a sample of 1,901 general practitioners (GPs) working independently in 2006 
in five French regions. The empirical study discusses theory, using the specificities of the 
French independent medical sector with two payment scheme sectors coexisting, 
unregulated versus fixed fees. The objective of the econometric study was to test whether 
doctors’ choices are affected by the payment characteristics of the sector in which they 
operate. Section 3 presents the results of econometric modelling, which shows highly 
contrasting behaviour between doctors in “sector 1”, limited by a fixed-fee system, i.e., 
fixed by an agreement between National Health Insurance and physicians’ trade unions that 
allows patients to be reimbursed by the public health insurance, and doctors in “sector 2,” 
where there is greater freedom for doctors to set their fees. 
  
1. Supply of services by self-employed GPs  
In this section we present a behavioural model for the supply of services by GPs according 
to the characteristics of their environment. The choice of the doctor is illustrated in the 
framework of the neo-classical theory of the labour supply, taking into account that 
independent doctors take two decisions: total working time and consultation rates. The dual 
dimension of these choices is illustrated in Figure 1. The time endowment Z0 is divided into 
two traditional components: leisure and working-time. However, contrary to standard 
labour economics, the latter is not “homogeneous” and it depends on the choice of 
consultation length. A given working-time can therefore be calculated from multiple 
combinations of consultations of different length.  
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Figure 1. Work/leisure tradeoff and free distribution of consultations 
 
Z, leisure h, working time 
Z0, time endowment 
b, consultation length 
 
  
 1.1. Choice of activity in the case of an ambulatory general practitioner 
In the context of labour supply theory, the doctor’s aim is to obtain an income from his/her 
work that enables her to finance all or part of her consumption (his/her standard of living). 
Formally, the physician’s choice can be expressed as follows: 
 
max
C,Z ,w
U C, Z( )
sc
C = wn
Z = Z0 − nb
b ≥ b
n ≤ d w,b( )







                                                              (1) 
The objective function traditionally adopted is a utility function U(C,Z) integrating the 
consumption of a generic good, C, and leisure, Z (Thornton and Eakin (1998)). Leisure is 
defined as the amount of time available once the medical activity is completed. The doctor 
has a fixed time endowment, Z0, which he/she is free to distribute between leisure, Z, and 
the total time of her medical activity. Each consultation has a random length b%  with 
average length denoted b E b =  
%
. The GP undertakes a number of consultations, n.  
The price of the consumer good is fixed to unity, and the price of each consultation is 
expressed by w. In programme 1, physicians are confronted with a number of constraints: 
• a budget constraint regarding the purchase of consumer goods; 
• a time constraint distributing the time available between work and leisure; 
• a constraint on the minimum quality of healthcare provided with a minimum 
threshold for the length of consultation (noted as b ). This constraint may be based 
on respect for professional standards or institutional rules, patient demands, or 
even social behavioural rules; 
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• a market constraint, since the supply of independent healthcare services must 
match patients’ demand. 
Since 1971, registration and licensing in France are based on a quota system called 
"numerus clausus": the number of students allowed to enrol in medical school is set each 
year by the government. Entry on the GP's market is then mainly controlled through 
education. The quota system in the University, associated with free choice of location, 
creates a monopolistic competition market for physicians’ services and activity. Each 
doctor is therefore facing a finite demand in the locality where he/she is settled. We define 
the demand for GP’s services d(w,b) as a function of the price of those services (fee per 
consultation) and the length of the consultation (b). McGuire (2000) proposes a “net benefit 
function” for the patient that depends on the fee, the level of medical activity, and the level 
of quality provided by the physician. This net benefit function plays a role similar to our 
demand function. The patient is sensitive to the price of medical activities and to the level 
of quality supplied by the physician. In our model, we consider “quality” and “length of 
consultation” equivalent, an assumption already suggested by McGuire (2000) and 
confirmed by empirical studies (Freeman at al. (2002) for a review for Great-Britain). In 
short, this means that patients perceive the length of consultation as a measure of quality.  
For medical labour supply, the message of this model is that the “cost of quality” is defined 
by the value of the time spent in each consultation in terms of leisure losses. Doctors not 
only have to decide their total working-time, but also to fine-tune a partition of total 
working-time between quantity and quality. The final choice regarding Z (total time) and b 
(length of consultation) will be a complex trade-off defined at both the supply side 
(intrinsic preference for leisure) and the patient side (demand for quality).  
The characteristics of the healthcare system also influence the possible choices of 
ambulatory medical activity. The model enables us to describe two simple situations. In the 
first case, the price of a consultation is centrally established and is the result, for example, 
of negotiations between unions and Health Insurance or is an arbitrary price fixed by the 
government. When the price of a consultation is set, the doctor can decide only the length 
of the consultation and the number of consultations undertaken. In the case of “deregulated 
fees”, the doctor can adjust her prices above the minimum level established by the 
regulations. These two situations are studied successively to demonstrate the interaction 
between institutional and economic constraints and the preferences of the self-employed 
GP in choosing her activities.  
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 1.2. Choice of activity and fixed price per consultation 
For doctors subject to a fixed-price w , the choice is based on the length of consultation b 
and the number of consultations n. In this context, the first-order Kuhn and Tucker 
conditions of programme (1) can be written as follows, maximising U in n and b: 
 
wUC − bUZ + λ2 = 0
−nUZ + λ1 − λ2∂d w,b( )/ ∂b = 0
λ1 b− b( )= 0
λ2 n− d w,b( )( )= 0








                                      (2) 
with: 
 
UZ = ∂U C, Z( )/ ∂Z ,  UC = ∂U C, Z( )/ ∂C . 
Several situations can be considered according to whether or not the constraints of 
minimum quality and local market equilibrium are bounded.3 In this paper, all doctors 
questioned earned at least a part of their professional income from their self-employed 
activities and then did not choose total inactivity as being an optimum solution. The 
existence of large fixed costs linked to the independent activity of the doctor (length of 
schooling, fixed installation costs) is a priori sufficient to guarantee the existence of an 
internal solution to the labour supply problem. This situation occurs when physicians use 
consultation length to maximise patient satisfaction. In doing so, they have to attract 
demand and to balance the local market of medical consultations. In this case, the market 
constraint is bounded and the quality constraint is relaxed; in this way, the length of 
consultation offered is greater than the minimum fixed duration. This results in the system: 
 
UZ / UC = w / b( ) ε2 / 1+ε2( ) 
n = d w,b( )




                                     (3) 
which determines both the length and the number of consultations realised by the doctor. 
Here, ε2 represents the consultation length-elasticity of demand. The budget constraint and 
the time constraint provide the recursive definition of the level of consumption and the 
level of leisure achieved. This system of equations demonstrates that the choice of the 
consultation length is based both on physicians’ preferences in terms of consumption and 
leisure and on the characteristics of the demand. Simple calculus shows that the marginal 
                                                          
3
  The list of inequality constraints is not exhaustive. A certain number of constraints were 
ignored as being non-pertinent for the analysis undertaken in this paper. This is particularly true for 
the constraint 0Z Z≤ , which is widely used in studies concerning participation on the labour market. 
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rate of substitution of consumption for leisure 
 
(UZ / UC )  is equal to the “fee”  w , corrected 
by a factor 
 
1 / b( ) ε2 / 1+ε2( )  . 
This former correction can be explained by the specificities of the fee-for-service activity. 
Indeed, in the context of the medical activity, the doctor controls the length of consultation. 
Therefore, the pertinent remuneration is not the payment of the service, w , but rather the 
price per consultation time unit /w b . The margins of adjustment are greater than for an 
“ordinary” employee due to the ability to fine-tune total work time in accordance with the 
length (given by b) and number of consultations accepted (given by elasticity 2ε ).  
 1.3. Choice of activity and “deregulated” fees 
The ability to adjust prices offers the doctor an additional opportunity to modify the 
demand on her services (in addition to the variable b). This situation occurs when the 
doctor is not subject to a fixed-price agreement, a payment scheme which concerns the 
most of GPs in France (see section 2). In this case, the first-order Kuhn and Tucker 
conditions of programme (1) can be expressed as follows, maximising U in n, b and w: 
 
wUC − bUZ + λ2 = 0
−nUZ + λ1 − λ2∂d w,b( )/ ∂b = 0
nUC − λ2∂d w,b( )/ ∂w = 0
λ1 b− b( )= 0
λ2 n− d w,b( )( )= 0










                                  (5) 
When doctors can choose the consultation price, the local market is automatically balanced 
(demand = supply for all λ2 ≠ 0)4. When the duration constraint is not bounded ( b b> ), 
the choice of the quantity, length, and price of the consultations obeys: 
 
UZ / UC = w / b( ) ε2 / 1+ε2( ) 
UZ / UC = w / b( ) 1+ε1( )/ ε1 
n = d w,b( )







                                     (6) 
where ε1 represents the price-elasticity of demand.  
This can also be expressed by: 
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UZ / UC = w / b( ) ε2 / 1+ε2( ) 
1+ε1 +ε2 = 0
n = d w,b( )






                                      (7) 
with ε 1 denoting the elasticity of demand to the price. The physician thus chooses the 
length and the price of consultation according to the characteristics of the patients in order 
to balance “price effects” and “quality effect” in her demand 
 
1+ε1 +ε2 = 0( ). The first two 
equations in (7) could be written as a mark-up over price 
 
(w − e) / w = −1 / ε1  and a mark-
up over consultation cost 
 
(w − e) / e = 1 / ε
2
with 
 
e = b(UZ / UC ) . The doctor, acting 
according to the best interests of her consumption/leisure trade-off, has now a second 
variable for adjusting her market conditions: w is added to b. The first-order condition 
1+ε1 +ε2 = 0  describes the terms of the trade-off between quality and price. In other 
words, the ability of the GP to regulate demand by price -instead of by length of 
consultation only- allows her to escape the situation in which he/she would have to 
decrease quality in order to gain leisure. In this way, creating a non-fixed-fees sector for 
independent GPs is expected to increase social well-being.  
However, note that a “special case” occurs when the physician, although free to choose the 
price, decides to modulate only the length of consultation and to adopt the regulation price 
level w  for her consultations. In this situation, the doctor deliberately chooses to position 
herself at w  as a result of her preferences and economic constraints, without being linked 
to any institutional constraint. This corner solution to the lowest fee may correspond to a 
situation in which the elasticity of demand to price is so high (poor patients, for example) 
that it is not possible to maintain a substantive clientele (n) by any adjustment of the 
quality/price ratio (b/p). Carrère (1991) has already shown that doctors can choose this 
corner solution when working with poor clients. 
Until now, our analysis has been carried out with the assumption that GPs faced a local 
market demand without any explicit competition between GPs. This simplifying 
assumption allowed us to focus precisely on GPs’ personal characteristics through their 
individual utility functions. It is possible to extend the model to explicitly account for 
competition between GPs at the global market level. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
that GPs are homogeneous except for their ability to set prices (sector 1 versus sector 2). 
                                                                                                                                                   
4
  The particular case of zero leisure (Z=0) is an exception. This specific case is not 
considered here. In the empirical section, the case is excluded, since the total work-time necessarily 
requires provision for rest time.  
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The regulator sets the number of GPs within each segment exogenously. Let b denote the 
quality of service provided by GPs who face fixed fees and b' denotes the quality of service 
provided by GPs who have the ability to choose the consultation fee w'. In such a 
framework it is straightforward to see that b will be solution of (3), and will serve as a 
quality constraint for GPs allowed to choose both consultation length b’ and fee w’. Then, 
b', w' and n’=d(w’,b’) will satisfy (7) with 
 
b ' ≥ b  as a minimum quality constraint.  
At the global market level, the market for health services from GPs will therefore be 
segmented between the low quality b offered at the fixed price 
 
w  and the high quality b' 
offered at a free price w'. One should note that we did not make the demand function 
homogeneous among segments. The model can allow for more specific demand functions, 
such as the one used by Pope (1989) or Mougeot and Naegelen (2005) where the number of 
consultations for each GP depends on her perception of the quality of several competing 
GPs and, in our model, from deviation from the reimbursed fee 
 
w . As shown by Mougeot 
and Naegelen (2005), such a demand function is well suited to represent quality 
competition à la Cournot among health providers. Except for explicit functional forms and 
determinants of global supply of health services, introducing such a demand function does 
not modify the very nature of GPs behaviour, as described by (3), (7) and the conclusions 
of our model (function d(b,w) “captures” the reactions of the clientele to GPs’ offers in a 
market with imperfect competition).   
 1.4 Summary  
In this section we developed a behavioural model for the supply of services by GPs 
according to the characteristics of their environment. Two settings were described: 1) a 
framework in which a regulator sets the price and lets the GP choose the consultation 
length of her activities; and 2) a framework in which the GP is free to choose both the 
consultation length and the corresponding fee. These two settings produce sharply 
contrasting predictions about a physician’s behaviour because the ability to set the 
consultation fee allows her to disconnect leisure choice from consultation length choice. In 
the first framework, this separation does not apply, so consultation length is based both on 
market/demand conditions and on physicians’ preferences. In the second framework, 
separation applies, so for a modified w, consultation length is only based on market/demand 
conditions. One should note here that consultation length in the first framework acts as a 
competitive constraint for a GP’s behaviour in the second framework. This creates a direct 
incentive for GPs in sector 2 to increase consultation lengths when unregulated fees and 
fixed fees both apply in the market.  
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2. Institutional context and data 
 2.1 Institutional context 
The framework prevailing in France for primary care is appealing for two main reasons. 
Fixed-fees and unregulated-fees billing schemes both exist at the same time, and potentially 
in the same place, for different GPs. In addition, there is no ex ante assignment of the 
clientele to the GPs (or to the billing sector). Patients are free to choose and change their 
GP. This situation (ex ante equal environment, except for the payment schemes), authorises 
the comparison in GPs’ behaviour between sectors. It is therefore possible to relate part of 
the observed difference in specific reactions to payment systems, taking into account, for 
the empirical test, that the clientele may be systematically different in sector 1 and sector 2 
at equilibrium. 
In 1980, French physicians’ unions obtained the creation of sector 2, which was presented 
as a way to bypass depreciation in the real-value of the regulated fee, during a period of 
high inflation. For GPs in sector 2, the counterpart of the free setting of fees was a specific 
tax system for their own social protection (more expensive). Free access to sector 2 has 
been closed since the early 1990s for GPs (although it remains open for specialists). Access 
then became very restrictive, conditioned by a specific licensing (“clinicat”) that GPs do 
not generally pass. GPs who benefited from sector 2 before 1990 were allowed to continue 
benefiting from it. This temporal “window of opportunity” explains why GPs in sector 2 do 
differ from their colleagues in sector 1, essentially by age characteristics (the difference is 
statistically significant, p=0.0001). Carrere (1991) provides a comprehensive view of GPs 
choices during the period of 1980-1990. Although they were allowed to change, more than 
80% of GPs decided to remain in sector 1, either because their clientele has limited capacity 
to pay extra prices (Carrere, 1991) or because they estimated that costs were offsetting 
benefits, considering their own characteristics (see table below).  
 
Main characteristics of the French primary care system – self-employed physicians 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 
Payment scheme  Fee-for-service Fee-for-service 
Prices of medical 
services 
Regulated prices, “prix 
conventionnés” fixed by an 
agreement between GPs and Health 
Insurance (“Assurance-Maladie”)  
Free pricing (fees higher than in 
sector 1); 
Cost for the GPs: greater 
personal social insurance 
contribution 
Coverage and 
dates 
Represents approximately 90% of 
GPs 
Created in 1980; access closed in 
1990 
Reimbursement 
for the patients 
Generally, 100% of the reference 
price. 70% by Public Insurance, 30% 
by complementary insurance 
Generally, the extra price is paid 
with out-of-pocket money, but 
certain complementary insurance 
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(“mutuelle” or private insurers) if 
the patient has paid for it (90% of 
the population). 
policies cover at least a part of 
the extra costs. 
 
Knowing that it was impossible to study the very early selection effect for GP between 
sector 1 and sector 2 (made before 1990)5, we choose to focus on clientele differences. 
Patients in sector 2 are richer and more educated (the extra price has to be paid). This could 
impact the level of the consultation length, regardless of price (Wiggers and Sanson-Ficher, 
1997). However, we do not focus on consultation duration per se, but on the relationship 
between consultation length and leisure choice, for both sectors. It is the first reason, in our 
view, why differences in clientele are not driving the results. Second, to control for 
clientele heterogeneity, we used different variables available for each GP including 
location, patient age-distribution, and, above all, the “percentage of patients eligible for free 
healthcare service programs for low-income people” (in average 7% of patients in sector 1 
versus 5% in sector 2, p=0.001). This variable is frequently used as a proxy for deprivation 
level in France (Saliba and Ventelou, 2007; Gemmill and al. 2008). 
 
  2.2 Data 
GPs sample is taken from a panel survey that has been set in March 2007 and that examines 
the medical practices of 1,901 GPs in five French regions: Normandy, Burgundy, Brittany, 
Loire and Provence. This panel was compiled from a joint initiative of the Ministry of 
Health, the National Federation of the Regional Health Observatories (ORS), and the 
Regional Unions of Self-employed Physicians (URML) in the regions concerned. In each 
region, the sample of GPs selected for this study is representative of the overall GPs’ 
population. The sample was obtained by random stratif ed sampling with the strata defined 
by gender, age (under 45, 45-53, 54 and older in 2006) and location (urban, suburban, 
rural). GPs were selected in the exhaustive professional repertory of French GPs in activity 
(ADELI). Doctors planning to stop practising or to move out of the region, as well as those 
who practiced exclusively complementary or alternative medicines such as homeopathy and 
acupuncture were excluded. 3,354 GPs were initially contacted: 1,453 refused to participate 
in the survey-panel, 1,901 accepted. The process of selection of GPs ended when all strata 
were completed with a uniform sampling rate, which finally makes the sample 
representative (at least with respect to the criteria of stratification: age, gender, location). 
                                                          
5
  It was not possible to study GPs’ choice of the billing sector, with the help of a selection 
equation in our econometric model. Indeed, since 1990, characteristics of GPs and of their clientele 
have substantially changed; it would be misleading to study the selection process with variables 
giving characteristics of GPs 20 years after the choice was made. The literature challenges this 
research question by using proxies based on characteristics of GPs, characteristics of the practices or 
their populations and their areas (Carrère 1991, Gravelle et Hahn 2006, Devlin and Sarma 2008). 
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The 1,453 GPs who refused to participate did not differ from participants according to 
practice location (p = 0.84) and gender (p = 0.22), but they were older (52.6 versus 51.7 
years, p < 10-3). Lack of time was the most frequent reason for refusal (54.5%). After that, 
due to missing data on several questions, 265 questionnaires (13.9%) were withdrawn from 
the following analyses for a final sample size of 1,636 GPs. These GPs did not differ from 
the other 1,901 initially included according to practice location (p=0.29), gender (p=0.18), 
age (p=0.11) and billing sector (p=0.18). Results presented in this paper are based on this 
panel of 1,636 GPs. 
The first survey took place in March and April 2007. It collected data from GPs concerning 
activity levels, such as workload, list size, and number and type of consultations. This 
survey also included data from the Individual Receipt for Activities and Prescribings 
(RIAP), in which Health Insurance records all reimbursed spending for insured patients. 
The three variables of interest used in the present analysis were obtained as follows (see 
Table 1).  
The variable “leisure time” (hours per week) is defined as the time remaining after 
subtracting the time each GP reported to have worked: Z=Z0-(n.b). More precisely, leisure 
time is calculated as seven times 24 hours (Z0) minus the declared number of hours worked 
for a typical week, i.e. a week without any holiday. In this calculation, we nevertheless 
added the weekly leisure time corresponding to the declared number of weeks of holidays. 
The variable “length of consultation” (b, in minutes) was calculated by dividing the time 
devoted to patients (total time worked in the independent practice, minus the time devoted 
to administrative tasks, medical training, and receiving medical representatives) by the 
number of consultations. The calculation takes into account a constant travel time for all 
house consultations, with a value of 10 minutes for GPs located in urban area, and 20 
minutes for GPs located in rural area. We obtained an average rhythm of practice, which is 
not observed directly on a specific day, but rather reflects average rhythm of activity over 
the entire year.  
The variable “price of consultation”, w, is declared by each GP in sector 2 as the “usual 
fees demanded”. Generally, GPs in sector 2 display their fees in the waiting room. Thus, we 
can hypothesize that GPs have declared this amount, although GPs can modulate their fees 
case by case, “with tact and moderation” as the Medical Council (“Ordre des médecins”) 
describes. In sector 1, the fee for consultation was fixed at 21 euros in 2007 ( w ).  
The calculation of the three variables above is based on empirical data. These data have one 
disadvantage in that they are partially self-reported by physicians. On the other hand, the 
data provide information not available elsewhere, for example, data concerning unregulated 
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fees, income, or total work time, which includes “non-medical tasks” such as 
administrative work, waiting and reception times of patients, reading and research time, and 
self-training.  
Other information that could lead to an occasional increase in the price or length of 
consultations was not available in the database. For example, information was unavailable 
on the number of consultations giving specific extra fees (week-end, public holiday, night, 
emergency, on-call), their content (type of pathology, technical or surgical intervention 
undertaken during the consultation), and the reason for the consultation (first consultation 
at the request of the patient, or follow-up consultation to monitor a previously identified 
pathology). Nevertheless, we can control our econometric regressions, which are specified 
using averaged variables for each GP, by global characterisation of their patient-list: % of 
patients between two given ages, % of patients with free healthcare because of low income 
and % of patients exempted from payment because of long-term illness (see Tables 2-4).6  
The average GPs’ age was 52 for men and 47 for women. Just over half (55.5%) of the 
physicians worked in group practices, while 41.5% own their own practice.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: consultation length, leisure time  
Variable  
[expressed as mean (stand. error)] 
Billing sector 1 :  
“fixed fees” 
(n = 1519) 
Billing sector 2 : 
“unregulated fees” 
 (n = 117) 
Consultation length (minutes) 24.8 (10.7) 34.7 (18.4) 
Leisure time per week (hours) 69.2 (12.7) 70.2 (11.6) 
Average consultation fee (euros) 21 (-) 30.3 (9.3) 
Note: Table 1 includes the 1,636 GPs for whom econometric analysis was possible (information for all variables 
was complete). From 1901 to 1636, half (144) of the 265 missing GPs could not be included in the final sample for 
technical reasons, (i.e. the impossibility of matching them with the database-system of the Health Insurance).  
GPs reported an average weekly working-time, including time on call, of 56.6 hours. The 
weekly working time does not significantly differ between the two GPs groups that we 
defined for this study. The average consultation length for GPs, including the periods of 
inactivity between patients, was 25.6 minutes, with significant differences (p < 0.0001) 
based on gender (29.0 minutes for women compared to 24.5 minutes for men) and sector 
(24.9 minutes for sector 1 compared to 34.8 minutes for sector 2). The average price of 
consultation in sector 2 was 30.2 euros. 
                                                          
6
  Consultations undertaken outside the scope of reimbursed healthcare are not considered, 
e.g., telephone or free consultations. 
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3. Results 
3.1 Lessons from the theoretical model for the estimation strategy 
The theoretical model has shown two important points that allow us to better define the 
empirical study: 
First, the set of constraints, as well as the results of the optimisation program, are clearly 
different between sector 1 and sector 2. It would be erroneous to pool the data and test a 
unique econometric model for the whole sample. There are in fact two patterns of choice 
depending on the sector of activity (fixed fees versus unregulated fees). 
Second, the econometric model has to be estimated with a specification test for 
simultaneous equations system (two-stage least squares -2SLS- or three-stage least squares 
-3SLS-, against separate ordinary least squares -OLS- as a benchmark), because both the 
length of consultation and the total workload could be endogenous one to another7. The 
first-order conditions of the theoretical analysis demonstrate a concomitant determination 
of worked hours (or leisure time) and length of GP consultation, both as a function of the 
environment of the GP (i.e. patients’ characteristics and the set of economic constraints 
linked to the sector of activity), and as a function of the personal GP’s characteristics 
(psychological parameters concerning her taste for leisure or family constraints, any of 
which may affect her availability to work). 
Subsequently, the econometric model was estimated, testing the potential endogeneity of 
the variables of interest (length of consultation, leisure time and fee in sector 2), separately 
for each sector of activity.  
The objectives of the econometric study are two-fold. The first objective is to verify that 
doctors’ choices are indeed affected by the “market characteristics” of the sector of activity 
in which they operate, and, in particular, to ascertain that GPs benefiting from deregulated 
fees (sector 2) adopt a different behaviour from the other GPs (sector 1). The second 
objective is to identify the direction of certain effects that remained ambiguous in the 
theoretical model, in particular the effects of the “price-sensitivity” of leisure time and 
length of consultations, both of which can be positive or negative depending on whether 
income effects or substitution effects dominate—as is the case in the microeconomics of 
the “backward-bending” labour supply curve. This is even more complex in the case of 
independent supply of medical services because, in addition to their total labour supply, 
                                                          
7
  Thornton and Eakin (1998) and Thornton (1998) defend a similar method. As we estimate 
the duration of consultation in an auxiliary equation (and the price per minute of medical activity), we 
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doctors may also adjust the consultation itself by increasing the number of shorter 
consultations. In sector 2, an additional level of ambiguity is observed since GPs set both 
the price and length of the consultations.  
Estimations have all been made with Stata Statistical Software, release 10 (StataCorp). 
3.2. Results (1): choice of model specification 
Specification tests were grounded on the comparison between OLS (ordinary least squares) 
models, 2SLS and 3SLS models (two and three-stage least squares, based on instrumental 
variables) and SURE (seemingly unrelated regression equations) models. We used Durbin-
Wu-Hausman statistics (DWH) as decision criterion (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, 
Nakamura and Nakamura, 1985). In sector 1, specification tests concerned two equations 
for each dependent variable: leisure time and consultation length.  In sector 2, we added a 
third equation for the price of consultation (level of fees). All the other variables have been 
considered exogenous, i.e., uncorrelated to the error terms. For 2SLS and 3SLS models, the 
excluded instruments are described just below the tables giving the results of the 
estimation. Instruments were selected for their orthogonality with the error terms of the 
main predicted equation (their contribution to the explanation of one of three dependant 
variables was important, and was negligible for the two others). The Sargan test (Sargan, 
1958) has been used for testing the quality of the instruments: the null-hypothesis is the 
joint assumption that the model is correctly specified and that instruments are valid. The 
presence of weak instruments has been tested by Anderson’s “identification test” 
(Anderson, 1984, Hall et al, 1996). We also considered The Hansen and Kleibergen/Papp 
tests as alternative assessments for over/under identification problems. Both were always 
consistent. All the continuous variables were converted into logarithms, which enabled us 
to interpret the estimated coefficients as elasticities, while simultaneously reducing the 
heteroskedasticity of the model.8 Results are given in Tables 2 and 3 for sector 1 and Table 
4 for sector 2. In each Table, the model finally selected is in bold characters. 
In sector 1, DWH tests comparing OLS and 2SLS models with instrumental variables show 
that 2SLS estimators are not more efficient than OLS estimators. We tested the effect of 
potential endogeneity of consultation length and leisure time in the model separately. P-
values were 0.908 and 0.974, respectively. At the same time, the SURE specification, 
taking into account correlations between error terms of the two estimated equations, 
                                                                                                                                                   
escape the theoretical issue of non-linearity in the budget constraint. Note that we also tested the 
endogeneity of fees in sector 2. 
8
  OLS models were estimated with robust standard errors. Available econometric software 
(e.g., Stata, SAS) do not allow for estimating 3SLS equations with robust standard errors. 
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dominated OLS modelling (specification test DWH, p = 0.000). Therefore, we selected this 
last specification for sector 1.  
In sector 2, DWH tests for 2SLS models with instrumental variables showed that OLS 
estimators were dominated. When “length” was the dependent variable in the main 
equation, the p-values of the DWH tests for leisure and price were 0.047 and 0.892, 
respectively. When “leisure” was the dependent variable in the main equation, the p-values 
of the DWH tests for length and price were 0.605 and 0.533, respectively. When “price” 
was the dependent variable in the main equation, the p-values of the DWH tests for length 
and leisure were 0.033 and 0.295, respectively. Therefore, we decided to select a 3SLS 
specification to properly deal with potential multiple endogeneity of variables in the 
simultaneous equations system. 
3.3. Results (2): comments on the estimates, increased flexibility in sector 2 
First, doctors’ behaviour, as estimated by separate models for sectors 1 and 2, revealed 
substantially different choices in time allocation: i) between leisure and working-time; and 
ii) regarding length of consultation. The econometric results illustrate the bidirectional 
sensitivity of leisure time with the length of consultation for GPs in sector 1 (Tables 2 and 
3), whereas this is clearly not the case in sector 2 (Table 4). In sector 1, GPs seem to 
establish consultation length and leisure time choices concurrently, each of the two 
variables influencing the other in a negative manner. Leisure time determines consultation 
length (β = -0.420, p < 0.01) and the length of consultation influences leisure time (β = –
0.102, p < 0.01). In other words, the more time a doctor can devote to each patient’s 
consultation, the less time the doctor has for leisure, and vice versa. SURE specifications 
warranted that we not over-interpret the coefficients because of misleading correlations 
between the error terms in the two equations. 
In contrast, Table 4 indicates a situation for sector 2 in which GPs seem to retain a certain 
degree of personal freedom in their time allocation decisions. These latter variables of 
interest showed no association with each other. The only variable of interest which can be 
explained in sector 2 by the two others is the fee, which showed a positive coefficient for 
consultation length (β = 0.294, p<0.01). In the present case, the estimated coefficient of 
0.294 measures the “agreement” between the GP and the patient9 that serves to balance the 
length of the consultation and the price paid. The consultation is longer but also more 
expensive.  
                                                          
9
  It is clear that this result, obtained in sector 2, documents a behaviour in which doctors are 
free to set their own price and the patients are free to accept the consultation (its length and its fee) 
always assuming that an alternative exists in the geographical zone of the patient, which, given the 
density of medical facilities in France, is quite realistic. 
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These results appear highly intuitive in light of the theoretical results obtained in section 1 
of this article. GPs in sector 2 can compensate for the deleterious effects of a relatively high 
average consultation length on their leisure time by charging higher prices. The price is a 
variable of adjustment that substitutes for leisure time in sector 1. For an aged or seriously 
ill clientele, who has longer time consultations than other patients, GPs in sector 2 are for 
instance able to maintain a satisfactory personal income by increasing the price per 
consultation. In sector 1, this strategy is not possible and GPs suffer more from the “time 
constraints” imposed by the characteristics of their patients (or, in some other cases, by the 
characteristics of their own family). If they wish to maintain a high income, leisure time is 
the only variable of adjustment.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we investigated several dimensions of the labor supply problem of self-
employed GPs. Only few studies examining self-employed practitioners have 
simultaneously analysed total working-time and the length of patient consultations. The 
rare available references concerning determinants of the length of consultation highlight 
medical factors: patients’ characteristics, the prevalence of severe illness, and sometimes 
physicians’ characteristics such as gender, age, and modalities of economic organisation 
(e.g. group practice versus solo)10. 
Taking into account the relationship between GPs leisure-choice and consultations length 
and using a panel of French GPs, we found the result that there exists a positive correlation 
between consultation length and unregulated fees, in the free-pricing sector in France. The 
result confirms the theoretical analysis and shows that indeed physicians translate a price 
increase into an improved “quality in service” (if we consider the situation in the most 
favourable terms possible, i.e. assuming that “quality in service” can be estimated from the 
average consultation length). It tends to legitimate unregulated-fees sector because it 
enables GPs to separate the need for treatment linked to their patients from their own time-
use considerations and economic constraints. When GPs can equate each elementary 
consultation to an ad hoc price, the price per minute of the medical intervention can be held 
                                                          
10
  Martin et al. (1997) and Carr-Hill et al. (1998), for example, found that female doctors 
dealing with patients of the same sex hold the longest consultations. Deveugele et al. (2002) claimed 
that one-third of the variability in consultation length is due to doctors’ characteristics and two-thirds 
are due to patients’ ones. These authors used data comparing several series of consultations in 
different Western countries. Scott and Shiell (1997) reported similar results for Australia.  
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constant regardless of the length of the consultation. The economic neutrality of “patients in 
good health” and “seriously ill patients” is perfectly achieved.  
As regards policy statements, we must concede that a limitation of our study is that we did 
not consider in our models (empirical and theoretical) the upstream choice by GPs to enter 
the primary care market and progressively select their types of the clientele. Another 
limitation is that we are not able to deal with intensive adjustments, consisting, for 
example, of replacing the most intensive and demanding interventions with more routine 
and easy consultations. Both effects are consistent with the view that the leisure needs of a 
GP are a key issue for the quality of care in general practice and that payment schemes (and 
levels of payment) could interact with quality through different behavioural adjustments. 
Further research will have to take these factors into account when evaluating, for example, 
the price-elasticity of the supply of a certain consultation length.  
On the whole, these results strengthen the idea that the consultation length devoted to 
patients cannot be easily disconnected from a GPs’ preferences (sector 1 comprises 90% of 
French GPs). The unregulated fees strategy is one possibility. However, it must be balanced 
with its cost, namely, an increase in fees and the likely consequence of a redistribution of 
welfare from patients to doctors. In this way, our results could be seen as a necessary, but 
clearly not sufficient, condition to legitimate unregulated fees in general practices. 
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Table 2. Consultation length (log) – Sector 1 
 OLS SURE 
Leisure time (log) -0.212 -0.420 
 (0.052)** (0.051)** 
Intercept 4.994 5.905 
 (0.258)** (0.256)** 
GP’s socio-familial characteristics  
Male -0.159 -0.176 
 (0.029)** (0.029)** 
Age -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.002)* (0.002)* 
Married -0.162 -0.159 
 (0.042)** (0.041)** 
Spouse working 0.057 0.056 
 (0.027)* (0.027)* 
Desire to reduce working-time -0.133 -0.155 
 (0.024)** (0.024)** 
Characteristics of the practice  
Group practice -0.106 -0.096 
 (0.024)** (0.024)** 
Alternative medicine (occasionally) 0.076 0.072 
 (0.034)* (0.034)* 
% of consultations at home -0.610 -0.691 
 (0.140)** (0.139)** 
Characteristics of the clientele 
% of patients with free healthcare because of low 
income (log) 
-0.647 
(0.171)** 
-0.617 
(0.170)** 
  
 
% of patients between 0-16 years (log) -1.617 -1.674 
 (0.248)** (0.247)** 
Number of observations 1519 1519 
R²  0.124 0.114 
  
 
AIC 1555.775 1440.788 
BIC 1678.253 1563.267 
Standard errors in parentheses ;  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Test of over-identification of Sargan - 2SLS 
 
P-value 
0.689 
Test of under-identification of Anderson - 2SLS 0.000 
Test J of over-identification of Hansen - 2SLS robust 0.630 
Test of under-identification of Kleibergen/Papp - 2SLS robust 0.000 
  
Test of endogeneity of Durbin/Wu/Hausman for leisure  – 2SLS 0.908 
  
Hausman specification test (OLS vs SURE) 0.000 
 
 
Instruments for leisure, P-values in univariate OLS models (sector 1) 
 
leisure  length 
Rural zone 0.000 0.515 
Offers free consultation (sometimes) 0.031 0.810 
Additional diploma since doctorate 0.013 0.382 
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Table 3. Leisure time (log) – Sector 1 
 
 OLS SURE 
Consultation length (log) -0.052 -0.102 
 (0.012)** (0.012)** 
Intercept 4.629 4.814 
 (0.056)** (0.056)** 
GP’s socio-familial characteristics 
Male -0.086 -0.096 
 (0.014)** (0.014)** 
Desire to reduce working-time -0.108 -0.113 
 (0.011)** (0.011)** 
Characteristics of the practice 
Group practice  0.043 0.038 
 (0.012)** (0.012)** 
Offers free consultation (sometimes) -0.031 -0.030 
 (0.014)* (0.014)* 
% of consultations at home -0.387 -0.417 
 (0.068)** (0.068)** 
Additional diploma since doctorate -0.029 -0.028 
 (0.011)* (0.011)* 
Rural practice -0.051 -0.050 
 (0.013)** (0.013)** 
Characteristics of the clientele 
% of patients between 0-16 years (log) -0.277 -0.355 
 (0.122)* (0.121)** 
Number of observations 1519 1519 
R² 0.146 0.137 
  
 
AIC 1554.508 1438.978 
BIC 1671.676 1556.145 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1% 
 
 
 
Test of over-identification of Sargan - 2SLS 
P-value 
0.396 
Test of under-identification of Anderson - 2SLS 0.000 
Test J of over-identification of Hansen - 2SLS robust 0.405 
Test of under-identification of Kleibergen/Papp - 2SLS robust 0.000 
  
Test of endogeneity of Durbin/Wu/Hausman for length of consultation – 2SLS 0.714 
  
Hausman specification test (OLS vs SURE) 0.000 
 
 
Instruments for length, P-values in univariate OLS models (sector 1) 
  leisure  length 
Spouse working 0.147 0.038 
Alternative medicine (occasionally) 0.655 0.028 
%  of patients with free healthcare because of low income 0.830 0.000 
Age 0.513 0.031 
Married 0.102 0.000 
Page 23 of 24
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
- 23 - 
 
Table 4. Results OLS and 3SLS – Sector 2 
 
 (1)  
Level of 
fees 
(2) 
Consultation 
length 
(3)  
Leisure 
time 
(1) 
Level of 
fees 
(2) 
Consultation 
length 
(3) 
Leisure 
time 
 OLS 3SLS 
Consultation length (log) 0.218  0.006 0.294  0.076 
 (0.035)**  (0.036) (0.057)**  (0.085) 
Leisure time (log) 0.044 -0.204  -0.239 -1.023  
 (0.102) (0.218)  (0.233) (0.576)  
Level of fees (log)  0.784 0.043 
 0.557 -0.113 
  (0.172)** (0.079) 
 (0.396) (0.196) 
Intercept 2.235 1.613 4.318 3.180 6.094 4.592 
 (0.484)** (1.131) (0.248)** (1.032)** (3.046)* (0.460)** 
GP’s socio-familial characteristics 
Male -0.058 -0.170 -0.046 -0.054 -0.245 -0.043 
 (0.053) (0.112) (0.048) (0.057) (0.131) (0.049) 
Married   -0.181 
  -0.192 
   (0.066)** 
  (0.061)** 
Working spouse   0.095 
  0.097 
   (0.034)** 
  (0.032)** 
Desire to reduce working-time -0.060  -0.072 -0.084  -0.072 
 (0.036)  (0.032)* (0.036)*  (0.031)* 
Characteristics of the practice 
Group practice  -0.174  
 -0.214  
  (0.086)*  
 (0.089)*  
Offers free consultations (sometimes)  -0.232 -0.079 
 -0.285 -0.064 
  (0.090)* (0.038)* 
 (0.096)** (0.042) 
Alternative medicine (occasionally)  0.174  
 0.217  
  (0.085)*  
 (0.084)**  
% of consultations at home  -0.967  
 -1.467  
  (0.442)*  
 (0.567)**  
Internet connexion  0.638  
 0.562  
  (0.240)**  
 (0.237)*  
Rural practice -0.182   -0.130   
 (0.073)*   (0.064)*   
Characteristics of the clientele 
% of patients exempted from payment§ (log)   -1.332 
  -1.464 
   (0.483)** 
  (0.480)** 
% of patients with free healthcare& (log)   1.910 
  2.098 
   (0.691)** 
  (0.647)** 
% of patients between 0-16 years (log)  -1.287  
 -1.400  
  (0.589)*  
 (0.612)*  
% of patients between 60-69 years (log) 4.096  1.646 3.806  1.906 
 (0.844)**  (0.810)* (0.849)**  (0.879)* 
% of patients above 70 years (log) -1.326   -1.188   
 (0.378)**   (0.382)**   
Number of observations 117 117 117 117 117 117 
R²  0.520 0.541 0.241 0.467 0.204 0.464 
    
   
AIC -13.846 -13.846 -13.846 36.870 36.870 36.870 
BIC 69.019 69.019 69.019 45.996 45.996 45.996 
Standard errors in parenthesis;  * significant at 5%; **significant at 1% 
§ because of long-term illness 
& because of low income 
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Instruments, P-values in univariate OLS models (sector 2) 
 
  Leisure 
time 
Consultation 
Length  
Level of 
fees 
Spouse working 0.006 0.416 0.886 
Married 0.007 0.232 0.717 
% of patients exempted from payment because of 
long-term illness (log) 0.006 0.898 0.656 
For leisure 
time 
 
% of patients with free healthcare because of low 
income (log) 0.006 0.868 0.417 
Rural practice 0.803 0.168 0.014 For fees 
 %  of patients above 70 years (log) 0.662 0.619 0.001 
%  of consultations at home 0.511 0.030 0.162 
Group practice 0.872 0.044 0.193 
Internet connexion 0.342 0.009 0.269 
For 
consultation 
length 
 Alternative medicine (occasionally) 0.471 0.042 0.242 
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